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The “wall of separation between church and State” is a metaphor based on
bad history, a metaphor which has proved useless as a guide to judging.
It should be frankly and explicitly abandoned.
—Justice William Rehnquist1

I.

INTRODUCTION

Many authors have reflected on, studied, and examined the
development and writing of the First Amendment Religion Clauses, which
states, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . .” in attempting to divine the original
public meaning of the Founding Era.2 Given the distinct cultural differences
that existed between and among New England, New York, the Middle
Atlantic States, Virginia, and the Deep South, it is not surprising that there
is some ambiguity about the history of the Religion Clauses.3 This lack of
clarity may partially trace its origins to the close ties between religion and
government during the Colonial Period. In fact, until the Revolutionary War,
there “. . . were established churches in at least eight of the thirteen former
colonies and established religions in at least four of the other five.”4
History aside, the perspective most often associated with the Supreme
Court and religion started with its 1947 judgment in Everson v. Board of
Education of Ewing Township (“Everson”); the Court’s first case on the
merits of a dispute involving education and religion embodies the
“Wall of Separation,” a metaphor coined by Roger Williams in 1644 but

1
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (invalidating a statute from
Alabama mandating a period of meditation or voluntary prayer in public schools as an endorsement
of religion lacking any clearly secular purpose).
2
U.S. CONST. amend. I. See generally Carl H. Esbeck, Uses and Abuses of Textualism and
Originalism in Establishment Clause Interpretation, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 489 (2011); Kent Greenwalt,
Common Sense About Original and Subsequent Understandings of the Religion Clauses, 8 U. PA. J. CON.
L. 479 (2006); Stephen K. Green, “Bad History”: The Lure of History in Establishment Clause
Adjudication, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1717 (2006); PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH
AND STATE (2002); Michael W. McConnell, The Supreme Court's Earliest Church-State Cases: Windows
on Religious-Cultural-Political Conflict in the Early Republic, 37 TULSA L. REV. 7 (2001);
LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (N.C. Press,
2d ed. 1994) (1986). These various sources discuss the general background and debate regarding the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses.
3
See generally David Jaffee, Religion and Culture in North America, 1600–1700, THE METRO.
MUSEUM OF ART (Oct. 2004), http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/recu/hd_recu.htm (discussing
the religious differences in the Colonial regions); Religion in Colonial America: Trends, Regulations, and
Beliefs, FACING HISTORY AND OURSELVES, https://www.facinghistory.org/nobigotry/religion-colonialamerica-trends-regulations-and-beliefs (last visited June 10, 2022) (discussing the cultural differences
in the Colonial regions).
4
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 428 n.10 (1962).
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popularized by Thomas Jefferson’s Letter to the Danbury Baptist Convention
of January 1, 1802.5 Jefferson wrote:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which
lies solely between man and his God . . . I contemplate with
sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people
which declared that their legislature should “make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof,” thus building a wall of separation
between Church and State.6
As popular as the “Wall” metaphor became, the Supreme Court did
not cite it until 1878—seventy-six years after Jefferson used it when writing
that letter in his personal capacity—in Reynolds v. United States
(“Reynolds”), a dispute from the then Utah Territory.7 In Reynolds,
the Justices rejected a claim that the Free Exercise Clause exempted a member
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints from a federal statute
prohibiting polygamy.8 Instead, the Court ruled that while the federal
government cannot generally interfere with the beliefs of individuals, it may
do so if their religious practice violates the law.9 The Court concluded that
although the plaintiff was free to believe in polygamy, an act it described as
“always [having] been odious among the northern and western nations
of Europe,” the Court emphasized that he could not practice it because doing
so violated a duly-enacted statute.10
The Supreme Court did not apply “the Wall” in an education case
until Everson, where they upheld a New Jersey statute that permitted local
school boards to regulate student transportation that some parents relied on
to send their children to Roman Catholic schools.11 Justice Black’s opinion
essentially articulated the Child Benefit Test—sometimes termed
“parochaid,” the use of public aid to support non-public schools—because
many schools, especially those affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church
at the elementary level, were, and largely still are, associated with

5
330 U.S. 1 (1947); Roger Williams, Mr. Cotton’s Letter Lately Printed, Examined and Answered
(1644), reprinted in 1 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS 313, 392 (1963) (“and that when
they have opened a gap in the hedge or wall of Separation between the Garden of the Church and
the Wilderness of the world . . . .”).
6
16 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 281–82 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh
eds., 1903).
7
See 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879).
8
See generally id.
9
See id. at 162, 165–66.
10
Id. at 164–67.
11
See generally Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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specific parishes.12 The Child Benefit Test is a legal construct under which
the Court permitted states and local school boards to provide publicly funded
aid to assist children rather than their faith-based non-public schools.13
Essentially analogous to a third-party beneficiary situation—the students gain
the most in the relationship by being educated in the schools their parents
have selected.
On the question of aid, Everson stands out because, without naming
it per se, Justice Black’s opinion initiated the Child Benefit Test—a measure
that has played a significant role in Establishment Clause analysis since its
inception.14 Over the decades following Lemon v. Kurtzman (“Lemon”),
historically the Court’s most significant case involving the Establishment
Clause and education, the Justices reviewed a considerable amount of
litigation on religion and schooling as well as in various aspects of public life,
addressing the boundaries of state aid to faith-based schools or institutions
and their students.15
In Lemon, the Justices created the now-familiar albeit malleable,
tripartite test.16 When courts apply this test to evaluate interactions between
faith-based institutions and the state, jurists must be convinced: “[F]irst,
the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement
with religion.’”17
As significant as Lemon has become in its First Amendment
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court occasionally relied on two other tests
12
Id. at 14, 17–18. The Court essentially presaged the Child Benefit Test in Cochran v. Louisiana
State Board of Education. See generally 281 U.S. 370 (1930) (upholding a program that provided
textbooks to all students regardless of where they attended school because the children, rather than their
schools, were the beneficiaries of the law as far as it served a valid secular purpose). The most recent data
reveal that 65.2%, or 3,138 of 4,812 of Catholic elementary schools in the United States are operated by
single parishes while 12.2% or 587 are interparish schools, 15.7% or 754 are run by dioceses, and 6.9% or
333 are private in nature. Dale McDonald & Margaret Schultz, UNITED STATES CATHOLIC ELEMENTARY
AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS 2020–2021: THE ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT ON SCHOOLS, ENROLMENT
AND STAFFING 10 (2021). Conversely, only 9.1% or 106 of the 1,169 Catholic secondary schools are
operated by parishes while 8.6% or 101 are run as interparish schools, 37.5% or 438 are diocesan, and
44.8% or 524 are private. Id. Although the table does not specify it, many schools it identifies as private
were founded by religious orders.
See Ali Trachta, What Is a Parochial School, NICHE,
https://www.niche.com/blog/catholic-school-vs-parochial-school/ (July 24, 2018).
13
See George R. La Noue, The Child Benefit Theory, in 4 THEORY INTO PRACTICE 18, 18 (1965).
14
See id. at 18–19.
15
See generally 403 U.S. 602 (1971). Because many, if not all, of the cases discussed, have been
subject to considerable academic scrutiny, except for key decisions, the summaries tend to be thumbnail
sketches rather than detailed analyses because they are helping to make the larger point, discussed in Part V
of this Article, that the all-too-familiar tripartite Lemon test in its current form has outlived its judicial
usefulness.
16
Id. at 612–13.
17
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Waltz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
For a representative commentary on point, see generally Josh Blackman, This Lemon Comes as a Lemon:
The Lemon Test and the Pursuit of a Statute's Secular Purpose, 20 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 351
(2010).
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involving religion and public education. In Lee v. Weisman, Justice Kennedy
announced the psychological coercion test to forbid prayer at public school
graduation ceremonies.18 Under this test, the Court rejected school prayer
because the state, through the principal, played a pervasive role in the process
both by selecting who would pray and by directing its content.19 The Justices
also feared inviting a religious leader to pray could psychologically coerce
students because—as members of a captive audience who may have been
forced, against their wishes, to participate in ceremonies—they are not freely
excused from attending and being exposed to beliefs they disagree with;
the Court has avoided this part of the psychological coercion test in later
cases.20
Earlier, in Lynch v. Donnelly, a non-school case about the inclusion
of a Nativity scene in a Christmas display on public property,
Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion created the endorsement test regarding
the status of religious activity in public settings, asking whether the purpose
of the governmental action is to endorse or approve of a religion or religious
activity.21 A plurality of the Supreme Court upheld the inclusion of a Nativity
scene, or crèche, in a Christmas display on public property because with
a Christmas tree and menorah, other parts of the display, the crèche was set
in the broader context of the season, meaning the display did not endorse
a particular religion.22
As to prayer and religious activity, beginning with Engel v. Vitale,
the Supreme Court has been more consistent.23 More specifically, in the
context of public education, the Court banned school-sponsored prayer and
Bible reading at the start of school days or at public school graduation
ceremonies, as well as student-led prayer prior to high school football
games.24
Against this background, the remainder of this Article is divided into
four substantive parts. Part I examines the prehistory of Lemon. Part II
reviews the Supreme Court’s judgment in this seminal case along with its
progeny. This section largely focuses on cases involving aid to faith-based
schools and their students because they represent the lion’s share of litigation
18
505 U.S. 577, 591–93, 598–99 (1992). For representative commentaries on this case, see generally
Ralph D. Mawdsley & Charles J. Russo, Lee v. Weisman: The Supreme Court Pronounces the Benediction
on Public School Graduation Prayers, 77 EDUC. L. REP. 1071 (1992); David Schimmel, Graduation
Prayers Flunk Coercion Test: An Analysis of Lee v. Weisman, 76 EDUC. L. REP. 913 (1992).
19
Weisman, 505 U.S. at 591–93, 598–99.
20
Id.
21
465 U.S. 668, 687–91 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
22
Id. at 692–94.
23
See generally 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
24
See generally Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Weisman, 505 U.S.
577; Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
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in this contentious area.25 Part III examines the fundamental flaws of Lemon.
Part IV offers an alternative to the now-discredited tripartite Lemon test that
reflects the original public meaning of the Establishment Clause. This Article
rounds out with a brief conclusion.
II.

PREHISTORY OF LEMON

The First Amendment Religion Clauses explicitly apply only
to Congress.26 Consequently, the Supreme Court initially applied the
Free Exercise Clause to the States in a dispute involving religion through the
Fourteenth Amendment in Cantwell v. Connecticut.27 In Cantwell, the Court
invalidated the actions of Jehovah’s Witnesses when they violated a statute
against the solicitation of funds for religious, charitable, or philanthropic
purposes without prior approval of public officials because the law essentially
granted authorities unfettered power over the plaintiff’s right to express their
religious views in a peaceful manner.28 Following Cantwell, individuals have
the same rights in suits against the federal and state governments under the
Religion Clauses.29
A. Everson
As noted in Everson, the Justices articulated the Child Benefit Test,
thereby permitting publicly funded assistance to faith-based schools and their
students because the aid primarily assists children rather than their schools.30
Moreover, Everson is the initial case in the first of three stages through which
the Court’s modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence has evolved.31
At issue in Everson was a statute from New Jersey permitting local
school boards to adopt rules allowing them to enter contracts for student
transportation.32 After a local board authorized reimbursement to parents
for the money they spent on bus fares sending their children to Catholic
schools, a taxpayer challenged the law as unconstitutional on two grounds.33
First, he alleged that the law authorized the state to tax some citizens and
bestow their money on others for the private purpose of supporting non-public
25
For a then comprehensive review of Religion Clause litigation, see generally Mark David Hall,
Jeffersonian Walls and Madisonian Lines: The Supreme Court's Use of History in Religion Clause Cases,
85 OR. L. REV. 563 (2006).
26
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
27
310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). For an earlier, similar case, see Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666
(1925) (applying the First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and press to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment).
28
Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 307.
29
Id. at 303.
30
See supra notes 11–13 and accompanying text.
31
See generally Charles J. Russo & Ralph D. Mawdsley, The Supreme Court and the Establishment
Clause at the Dawn of the New Millennium: "Bristl[ing] with Hostility to All Things Religious”
or Necessary Separation of Church and State?, 2001 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 231 (2001).
32
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 3 (1947).
33
Id. at 3–4.
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schools in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.34 Second, the plaintiff
argued that the law was one “respecting an establishment of religion” because
it allegedly forced him to help support church-run schools in violation of
the First Amendment.35
Everson is noteworthy because the Opinion of the Court, written by
Justice Black, more deeply involved the Jeffersonian metaphor in the lexicon
of the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.36 Black declared
that “[t]he First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state.
That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the
slightest breach.”37
B. Prayer and Other Religious Activity
Subsequent litigation during the pre-Lemon period also involved
religious activities in public schools. In its first case on point, People of State
of Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education (“McCollum”), the Court
vitiated a program under which students were released from their classes, with
the approval of their parents, to receive instruction provided by religious
leaders in their faiths: Judaism, Roman Catholicism, and Protestantism.38
The Court struck the release program down for two reasons: the local board
made tax-supported buildings available to those who offered instruction
on religious doctrines and because, in so doing, its officials gave religious
groups invaluable, impermissible aid in helping them by providing students
for the classes through their ability to control the machinery and operations
of the state’s compulsory education laws.39
Starting with Engel v. Vitale (“Engel”), the Supreme Court handed
down an unbroken line of cases prohibiting school-sponsored prayer and
religious activities in public schools.40 In Engel, the Justices forbade the daily
use of prayer, composed by the New York State Board of Regents, in public
34

Id. at 5.
Id.
36
See Hall, supra note 25, at 583 (explaining that Justice Black’s opinion in Everson as a turning
point in First Amendment jurisprudence).
37
Everson, 330 U.S. at 18. For critiques of this case, see Raymond W. Kaselonis, Jr., Everson and
“The Wall of Separation Between Church and State”: The Supreme Court's Flawed Interpretation of
Jefferson's Letter to the Danbury Baptists, 17 REGENT U.L. REV. 101 (2004); Carl H. Esbeck,
The 60 Anniversary of the Everson Decision and America's Church-State Proposition, 23 J. L. REL. 15
(2008).
38
333 U.S. 203, 207–09, 212 (1948).
39
Id. at 212. But see Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 308–09 (1952) (upholding the constitutionality
of New York City’s release time program both because officials had the authority to accommodate
the religious wishes of parents by releasing their children at their request and insofar public schools were
not used for religious instruction, suggesting that it was like granting students excused absences
for religious reasons).
40
370 U.S. 421, 435 (1962).
35
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schools even if parents agreed to permit their children to participate.41
The Court banned the prayer because “[w]hen the power, prestige and
financial support of government is placed behind a particular religious belief,
the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to
the prevailing officially approved religion is plain.”42
A year later, in the companion cases of School District of Abington
Township v. Schempp (“Abington”) and Murray v. Curlett, the Supreme Court
invalidated a statute from Pennsylvania and a board policy from Maryland
mandating the students’ recitation of the “Lord’s Prayer”/”Our Father” and
Bible reading as part of the opening of school days.43 Acknowledging that
the Bible is a religious document and the First Amendment mandates
governmental neutrality, the Court struck down both practices on the basis
that states cannot aid any or all religions, coupled with the fact that individuals
have the right to make personal religious choices free from state
compulsion.44
Creating a two-part test in Abington to evaluate the constitutionality
of prayer and Bible reading in public schools, the Supreme Court declared
that “[t]he test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and the primary
effect of the [legislative] enactment? . . . . [T]o withstand the strictures of
the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and
a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.”45 In what may
have been an attempt to allay concerns that they and the Court were
anti-religious, the Justices specified that nothing in its judgment prohibited
the secular study of the Bible in public schools in appropriate contexts such
as literature or history.46 The Court added, “It certainly may be said that
the Bible is worthy of study for its literary and historic qualities. Nothing we
have said here indicates that such study of the Bible or of religion, when
presented objectively as part of a secular program of education, may not be
effected consistently with the First Amendment.”47
The first stage of the Supreme Court’s modern Establishment Clause
jurisprudence culminated in 1968 with Board of Education v. Allen
(“Allen”).48 In Allen, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
41

Id. at 422–23.
Id. at 431.
43
374 U.S. 203, 205 (1963). Karen Barber, The “Lord’s Prayer” or the “Our Father, PRAYER IDEAS
(March 2, 2012), https://www.prayerideas.org/the-lords-prayer-or-the-our-father-prayer/ (“The prayer
is usually called the Lord’s Prayer by Protestant groups because our Lord Jesus Christ authored
the Prayer. The prayer is called the Our Father (Pater Noster in Latin) in the liturgical/Catholic tradition
based on Jesus teaching us to begin by addressing God as ‘Our Father.’”).
44
Abington, 374 U.S. at 216.
45
Id. at 222 (citations omitted).
46
Id. at 300 (Brennan J., concurring).
47
Id. at 225. Justice Brennan hastened to state that “[t]he holding of the Court today plainly does not
foreclose teaching about the Holy Scriptures or about the differences between religious sects in classes
in literature or history.” Id. at 300 (Brennan, J., concurring).
48
392 U.S. 236, 238 (1968); see Russo & Mawdsley, supra note 31, at 236.
42
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a statute from New York directing local boards to loan textbooks to all
children in grades seven to twelve, regardless of where they were enrolled,
including both public and non-public, whether nonsectarian or faith-based,
schools.49 Rather than order officials of local public school boards to loan
students the same books and materials, the law authorized education officials
to approve titles prior to their adoption.50 The Allen Court was satisfied that
the statute passed constitutional muster because its purpose was not to aid
religion or non-public schools, and its primary effect was to improve
the quality of education for all children.51 The Justices upheld similar
textbook provisions in Meek v. Pittenger (“Meek”) and Wolman v. Walter
(“Wolman”).52
The years between the Court’s 1971 judgment in Lemon and
Aguilar v. Felton (“Aguilar”) in 1985, the second phase, were the nadir of the
Child Benefit Test, from the perspective of its supporters, as the Justices
largely refused to move beyond the limits created in Everson and Allen.53
The Court’s 1993 ruling in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District
(“Zobrest”) breathed new life into the Child Benefit Test, allowing it to enter
a phase extending to the present.54
III.

LEMON AND ITS PROGENY

A. The Lemon Decision
At issue in the companion cases of Lemon v. Kurtzman and
Earley v. DiCenso were statutes from Pennsylvania and Rhode Island.55
The Pennsylvania statute authorized the state Superintendent of Public
Instruction to make specified secular educational services from non-public
schools.56 The Superintendent’s office directly reimbursed officials in
participating faith-based schools for teachers’ salaries, textbooks, and

49

Allen, 392 U.S. at 238.
Id. at 239.
51
Id. at 243. In his dissent, Justice Black exhibited his antipathy to supporters of aid for faith-based
schools and their students, describing them as “powerful sectarian religious propagandists who have
succeeded in securing passage of the present law to help religious schools carry on their sectarian religious
purposes can and doubtless will continue their propaganda, looking toward complete domination
and supremacy of their particular brand of religion.” Id. at 251 (Black, J., dissenting). For a more detailed
discussion of Justice Black’s attitude toward Catholics, see infra notes 169–74 and accompanying text.
52
421 U.S. 349 (1975); 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
53
See 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
54
See 509 U.S. 1 (1993). But see Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (upholding a law from
Washington that denied a student a scholarship because he wished to pursue a degree in pastoral theology
where doing so would have violated rules forbidding the release of funds to pay for those who wished
to study for the ministry).
55
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 606 (1971).
56
Id. at 609.
50
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instructional materials in specific secular subjects: mathematics, modern
foreign languages, physical science, and physical education.57
The Rhode Island law allowed state officials to supplement the pay
of certified teachers of secular subjects identified in the previous paragraph in
non-public elementary schools by directly paying them amounts not more
than fifteen percent of their current annual earnings; the salaries they received
could not exceed the maximum paid to public school teachers.58
The supplements were available to teachers in non-public schools, where
“average per-pupil expenditure[s] on secular education [were] less than the
average in the State’s public schools . . . .”59 Teachers in non-public schools
were required to use the same materials as educators in public schools.60
Lemon stands out for the tripartite test the Supreme Court created that
became the standard in cases involving the Establishment Clause.61
In creating this measure, the Justices added a third prong, regarding excessive
entanglement, taken from Walz v. Tax Commission of New York City, wherein
it upheld New York State’s practice of providing state property tax
exemptions for church property used in worship services, to the two-part test
it created in Abington.62 According to the Court:
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of
the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many
years. Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases.
First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute
must not foster “an excessive government entanglement with
religion.”63
Addressing entanglement and state aid to religious institutions, the
Supreme Court delineated three additional factors to take into consideration.64
Explaining the scope of these factors, the Court observed that courts
“must examine the character and purposes of the institutions that are
benefitted, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting
relationship between the government and religious authority.”65
The Lemon Court expressed its concern that the relationship between
public officials and schools because these schools are an integral part of
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Id. at 609–10.
Id. at 607–08; id. at 637 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Id. at 607 (majority opinion).
Id. at 608.
Id. 612–13.
See 397 U.S. 664, 670 (1970).
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13 (citations omitted).
Id. at 615.
Id.
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the mission of the Roman Catholic Church, involved substantial religious
activities.66 About 95% of the pupils who benefitted from the program
attended schools affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church in Rhode Island,
where “[a]pproximately two-thirds of the teachers in these schools are nuns
of various religious orders.”67 Concomitantly, in Pennsylvania, “[m]ore than
96% of these pupils attend church-related schools, and most of these schools
are affiliated with the Roman Catholic [C]hurch.”68 While Catholic schools
clearly predominated in these jurisdictions, denying them aid on this basis
may well represent an inference of impermissible religious discrimination.69
In Lemon, the Supreme Court distinguished aid for teachers’ salaries
from secular, neutral, or non-ideological services, facilities, or materials.70
Citing Allen, the Court remarked that teachers have a substantially different
ideological character than books or transportation.71 As to the potential for
involving faith or morals in secular subjects, the Justices feared that while
the content of textbooks can be known, teachers’ handling of subject matter
is not.72
The Lemon Court further expressed its concern that the amount
of oversight necessary to ensure that teachers avoided non-ideological
perspectives, even absent feasible allegations of impropriety, gave rise to
impermissible entanglement.73 While acknowledging that “[t]axpayers
generally have been spared vast sums by the maintenance of these educational
institutions by religious organizations, largely by the gifts of faithful
adherents,” the Court was of the view that because “[t]he sole question
[before it was] whether state aid to these schools can be squared with the
dictates of the Religion Clauses,” it had no choice but to invalidate both
laws.74
In what has become a “catch-22” situation, programs typically passed
Lemon’s first two prongs only to have various forms of aid to students in their
faith-based schools invalidated on the basis of excessive entanglement.75
This difficulty arises because while the first two prongs of the Lemon test
were developed in the context of a case involving prayer and Bible reading,

66

Id. at 616.
Id. at 608, 615.
Id. at 610.
69
Id. at 625.
70
Id. at 616–17.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 618–19 (noting the inherent conflict when educators who work under the direction of religious
officials in these schools’ face having to separate religious and secular dimensions of education).
73
Id. at 619.
74
Id. at 625.
75
See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 413–14 (1985).
67
68
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the third emerged in a non-educational context over tax exemptions.76
Notwithstanding the challenges associated with applying Lemon, the Supreme
Court applied it widely as a kind of “one size fits all” test in a variety of
disputes involving aid to non-public schools and their students. This created
more headaches for jurists, lawyers, and educators than it may be worth.
B. Lemon’s Progeny during the 1970s and 1980s
Following Lemon, the Supreme Court entered a period during which
it was all but unwilling to stray far from the limits it set in Everson and Allen.
Rather than engage in an exhaustive review of all the cases, this section
highlights illustrative cases rather than all the many cases the Court examined.
In Meek and Wolman, cases from Pennsylvania and Ohio, respectively,
the Justices reviewed textbook provisions similar to the one in Allen.77
However, in Wolman, the Court invalidated a law allowing the use of public
funds to transport students from faith-based schools to field trips by
categorizing such activities as curricular in nature and viewing them as
instructional rather than non-ideological secular services.78
At the same time, in Meek, the Court struck down a program that
provided periodicals, recordings, films, laboratory equipment, and equipment
for recording and projecting, thereby interpreting the law as having
the primary effect of advancing religion due to the predominantly religious
character of participating schools.79 The Justices maintained that insofar
as the faith-based schools were the primary beneficiaries, the aid assisted their
sectarian enterprises as a whole, demonstrating that they clearly did not
understand the challenge of trying to teach high school chemistry without
laboratory equipment such as beakers.80 Still, the Court did allow public
school personnel to receive textbook assistance on-site in faith-based schools
but then forbade the delivery of auxiliary services, such as remedial and
accelerated instructional programs, guidance counseling and testing,
and services for children who were educationally disadvantaged—for fear
that the amount of oversight needed to have ensured neutrality would have
resulted in excessive entanglement.81
In Wolman, the Justices struck down a program that permitted loans
of instructional equipment, including projectors, tape recorders, record

See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
See Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
Wolman, 433 U.S. at 254–55.
79
Meek, 421 U.S. at 354–55, 363.
80
Id. at 664–66. The trial court in Meek mused that “[g]iving free rein to the imagination one could,
perhaps, visualize a religious teacher storing holy water in a chemistry laboratory beaker, . . . [but added
that] judicial concern about these possibilities cannot, standing alone, warrant striking down a statute
as unconstitutional.” Meek v. Pittenger, 374 F. Supp. 639, 660 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
81
Meek, 421 U.S. at 367, 370–72.
76
77
78
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players, maps and globes, and science kits.82 As in Meek, the Court
invalidated the law due to its fear that the aid supported the religious roles of
the schools considering the difficulty of separating the secular and sectarian
functions for which these items were being used.83 The Court did allow public
school officials to supply non-public schools with state-mandated tests while
allowing public school employees to go on-site to perform diagnostic tests to
evaluate whether students needed speech, hearing, and psychological
services.84 The Justices also permitted public funds to be spent on providing
therapeutic services to students from non-public schools if they were
delivered in neutral, off-site locations since doing so would not risk the
impermissible effect of advancing religion.85
Mueller v. Allen (“Mueller”) represented an exception during the
second phase under Lemon.86 In Mueller, the Supreme Court upheld the law
from Minnesota granting all parents state income tax deductions of up to $500
for children in grades K–6 and up to $700 for those in grades seven through
twelve for the costs of tuition, textbooks, and transportation associated with
sending their children to K–12 schools.87 The Mueller Court was persuaded
that the law permitting the deductions passed constitutional muster because it
passed all three of Lemon’s prongs.88
As indicated, the low point for the Child Benefit Test emerged
in Aguilar.89 At issue in Aguilar was the constitutionality of allowing the
New York City Board of Education (“NYCBOE”) to assign public school
teachers to provide remedial instruction in such subjects as reading skills and
remedial mathematics under Title I of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965 (“Title I”) for children who were educationally
disadvantaged, on-site in faith-based schools.90 Even though the NYCBOE
developed multiple safeguards to ensure that public funds were not spent for
religious purposes, satisfying the first two prongs of the Lemon test, the Court
vitiated the program based solely on its fear that a monitoring system might
have created excessive entanglement between church and state.91 The Court
82

Wolman, 433 U.S. at 249.
Id. at 250.
84
Id. at 241–42.
85
Id. at 248.
86
463 U.S. 388 (1983).
87
Id. at 390–91.
88
Id. at 394–96, 402–04.
89
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
90
Id. at 404. For an earlier case involving the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, see
Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402 (1974) (interpreting the law as not requiring public school officials to use
federal funds to provide on-site instruction for children who were educationally deprived in their
faith-based schools).
91
Felton, 473 U.S. at 414. On the same day as Aguilar, in Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball,
the Court invalidated a shared time program from Michigan, and ordered the discontinuation of
83
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reached this outcome despite the lack of credible allegations of improper
behavior, prompting Justice O’Connor to pen a strident dissent in Aguilar,
presaging her opinion for the Court in Agostini v. Felton (“Agostini”).92
C. Retreating from Lemon during the 1990s and early 2000s
Twelve years after Aguilar, in Agostini, the Supreme Court, in an
unusual order authored by Justice O’Connor, dissolved the injunction
it upheld in Aguilar.93 In a major shift in its jurisprudence, due to changes
in the composition of the Court, the Justices reasoned that the Title I program
did not violate any of the three standards it used to consider whether state aid
advanced religion absent governmental indoctrination.94 The Court decided
that Title I, which provided supplemental, remedial instruction and
counseling services on a neutral basis to children whose families are
economically disadvantaged, did not violate the Establishment Clause
because the program contained adequate safeguards.95 Perhaps the most
significant aspect of Agostini was the Court’s modification of the Lemon test
by reviewing only its first two parts, purpose and effect while recasting
entanglement as one criterion in reviewing a law’s effect.96
Previously, Zobrest reinvigorated the Child Benefit Test,
transitioning into the Supreme Court’s third and current phase with regard
to the Child Benefit Test.97 Relying on the far-reaching Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, the Court determined that enabling a sign
language interpreter to help a student in Arizona who was deaf
was constitutional because it was neutral aid that did not offer financial

an after-school community education program in which teachers from faith-based schools worked
part-time for the local public board, instructing students in their own buildings. 473 U.S. 373, 375–76,
380–81 (1985).
92
See Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 402; id. at 426 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
93
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 208–09 (1997). For a commentary on this case, see
Allan G. Osborne, Jr. & Charles J. Russo, The Ghoul is Dead, Long Live the Ghoul: Agostini v. Felton and
the Delivery of Title I Services in Nonpublic Schools, 119 EDUC. L. REP. 781 (1997).
94
Agostini, 521 U.S. at 209 (noting there were no distinctions between recipients based on religion
and there was no excessive entanglement). Justices Brennan and Marshall, both supporters of the Wall,
retired in 1990 and 1991, respectively; among the replacements joining the bench were critics of the Wall
who did not uniformly, if at all, rely on it, Rehnquist (1986), Scalia (1986), Kennedy (1988), and Thomas
(1991). See cases cited infra note 150; About the Court, Justices 1789 to Present, SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES, https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx (last visited June 11, 2022).
Justice Souter, appointed in 1990, was generally a separationist who supported the Wall.
Charles C. Haynes, Farewell, Justice Souter, defender of Mr. Jefferson’s wall, HERALDNET
(June 18, 2009, 12:15 PM), https://www.heraldnet.com/opinion/farewell-justice-souter-defender-of-mrjeffersons-wall/; see Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 685–86 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(raising the specters that allowing vouchers would create another “Balkans, Northern Ireland, and
the Middle East”); see also id. at 687 (Souter, J., dissenting).
95
Agostini, 521 U.S. at 234–35.
96
See id. at 232.
97
See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993). For a representative commentary
on this case, see Ralph D. Mawdsley & Cynthia Dieterich, Limiting Services to Parochial School Students:
What Does Zobrest Now Mean?, 112 EDUC. L. REP. 555 (1996).
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benefits to his parents or school as the interpreter served as a conduit of
information helping him to learn.98
Another example of the shift in the Supreme Court’s thinking
transpired in Mitchell v. Helms (“Mitchell”), a case from Louisiana when it
expanded the boundaries of permissible aid to faith-based schools.99
A plurality of the Court upheld the constitutionality of Chapter 2 of Title I,
then Title VI, of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (“Chapter 2”),
a federal law allowing loans of instructional materials such as library books,
computers, television sets, tape recorders, and maps to faith-based schools.100
The Mitchell Court relied on Agostini’s modification of the
Lemon test, discussed above, reviewing only its first two parts while
recasting entanglement as one criterion in evaluating a statute’s effect.101
As the purpose part of the test was not at issue, the plurality thought it
necessary only to consider Chapter 2’s effect, finding that it did not foster
impermissible indoctrination because aid was allocated based on neutral
secular criteria neither favoring nor disfavoring religion and was available to
all schools based on secular, non-discriminatory grounds.102 The plurality
explicitly reversed those parts of Meek and Wolman inconsistent with its
analysis on loans of instructional materials.103
Two years later, in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (“Zelman”),
the Supreme Court upheld a voucher program from Cleveland that was part
of a larger program designed to help inner-city students in a failing public
school system that was not only taken over by the state but also operated under
a federal desegregation decree.104 The Court agreed that the program was
constitutional because it was open to both religious and secular beneficiaries
on a non-discriminatory basis.105 Also, the Court acknowledged that that
program offered aid directly to a broad class of parents who directed it to

98
20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.; Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 3, 10. For a commentary on the delivery of special
education services to students in faith-based schools, see Allan Osborne, Jr. & Charles J. Russo, Providing
Special Education Services to Students in Nonpublic Schools Under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act, 321 EDUC. L. REP. 15 (2015).
99
530 U.S. 793 (2000), reh’g denied, 530 U.S. 1296 (2000), on remand sub nom. Helms v. Picard,
229 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2000). For a commentary on this case, see Ralph D. Mawdsley & Charles J. Russo,
Religious Schools and Government Assistance: What is Acceptable After Helms?, 151 EDUC. L. REP. 373
(2001).
100
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 801, 803.Error! Bookmark not defined.
101
Compare Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 809, with Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232 (1997).
102
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 834–35.
103
Id. at 808.
104
See 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
105
Id. at 662–63.
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faith-based schools based entirely on their own genuine and independent
private choices rather than by operation of the law.106
D. The Roberts Court Ignores Lemon
The appointment of Chief Justice Roberts just before the Court’s
2005 Term and the appointment of Justice Alito in early 2006 suggested
a shift away from Lemon.107 In this regard, it is important to note that in
the sixteen years since John Roberts was appointed Chief Justice, the Court
has mentioned Lemon but has never utilized it when resolving
Establishment Clause cases in education or other contexts.108
Instead, as illustrated by Trinity Lutheran v. Comer
(“Trinity Lutheran”), Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue
(“Espinoza”), and Carson v. Makin, the Supreme Court has relied on both
Religion Clauses to expand religious liberty, thereby undermining any notion
of a “Wall of Separation.”109 More specifically, in Trinity Lutheran, the Court
ruled that the Free Exercise Clause does not allow states to single out
faith-based institutions and/or believers to be denied generally available
benefits simply because they are religious.110
At issue in Trinity Lutheran was a program from Missouri that
offered a limited number of reimbursement grants to reduce the volume
of used tires in landfills and dump sites to provide funds to nonprofit
organizations to purchase playground surfaces made from recycled tires. 111
Even though the school admitted students of any religion and was rated fifth
out of forty-four applicants vying for aid, state officials rejected the school’s
request simply because it was religious in nature.112 Writing for the Court,
Chief Justice Roberts pithily reasoned that “the exclusion of Trinity Lutheran
106
Id. But see Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004) (upholding a law from Washington that denied
a student a scholarship because he wished to pursue a degree in pastoral theology in violation of rules
forbidding the release of funds to pay for those who wished to study for the ministry).
107
Marcia S. Alembik, Note, The Future of the Lemon Test: A Sweeter Alternative for Establishment
Cause Analysis, 40 GA. L. REV. 1171, 1206–07 (2006).
108
Since the decision in Lemon, the Supreme Court has relied on it in twenty-two cases, none of which
occurred after Justice Roberts’s appointment to the Court. See cases cited infra note 150. Since
Justice Roberts’s 2005 appointment, the Court has avoided applying Lemon in its decisions. See cases
cited infra note 151.
109
See Trinity Lutheran v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017). For a commentary on this case, see
William E. Thro & Charles J. Russo, Odious to the Constitution: The Educational Implications of Trinity
Lutheran Church v. Comer, 346 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2017). See also Espinoza v. Mont. Dept. of Revenue,
140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020). For a commentary on this case, see Charles J. Russo & William E. Thro, The
Demise of the Blaine Amendment and a Triumph for Religious Freedom and School Choice:
Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, 46 U. DAYTON L. REV. 131 (2021). See Carson v. Makin,
2022 WL 2203333, — U.S. — (2022). For a brief review of this case, see Charles J. Russo, State funds
for students at religious schools? Supreme Court says ‘yes’ in Maine case—but consequences could go
beyond, CONVERSATION (June 21, 2022, 9:56 PM), https://theconversation.com/state-funds-for-studentsat-religious-schools-supreme-court-says-yes-in-maine-case-but-consequences-could-go-beyond-184618.
110
Trinity, 137 S. Ct. at 2025 (a church-affiliated preschool).
111
Id. at 2017.
112
Id.
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[Church] from a public benefit for which it is otherwise qualified, solely
because it is a church, is odious to our Constitution all the same, and cannot
stand.”113
Then, in Espinoza, the Justices reversed an order of the
Supreme Court of Montana that invalidated a tax credit program for
contributions to student scholarship organizations under the state
constitutional prohibition of public aid to “sectarian” schools.114 Upholding
the program, the Supreme Court found that because such aid was permissible
under the Establishment Clause, the no-aid provision in Montana’s
constitution discriminated based on religious status.115 The Justices decided
that while the state constitution sought to separate church and state more
stringently than its federal counterpart, it did not satisfy strict scrutiny because
it lacked a compelling interest.116
During the 2021 Term, the Supreme Court continued to dismantle the
Wall, replacing it with a “Chain Link Fence” in Carson v. Makin
(“Carson”).117 In Carson, the First Circuit bypassed Trinity Lutheran and
Espinoza, upholding a statutory tuition assistance program from Maine that
limited choices to nonsectarian private and public schools, explicitly
refusing to permit students to participate by attending faith-based schools.118
The First Circuit distinguished Carson from Espinoza and Trinity Lutheran,
arguing that the statute at issue did not display “hostility toward religion when
it imposes a use-based ‘nonsectarian’ restriction on the public funds that
it makes available for the purpose of providing a substitute for the public
educational instruction that is not otherwise offered.”119
Carson stands in stark contrast to A.H. ex rel. Hester v. French which
invalidated the actions of Vermont officials who rejected the application of
a student from a Roman Catholic high school who sought to participate in the
state’s dual-enrollment program.120 The student hoped to take two college
classes at public expense under the state’s “tuitioning” program, which

113

Id. at 2025.
Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2263.
115
Id. at 2262–63.
116
Id. at 2260.
117
See 973 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2020). For a brief commentary on this case, see Charles J. Russo &
James LaPolla, State Aid to Students in Faith-Based Schools: Controversy Continues, SCH. BUS. AFFAIRS,
Apr. 2021, at 33–35; see also Charles J. Russo & William E. Thro, Born of Bigotry, Died in Religious
Liberty: The Supreme Court Ends the Blaine Amendments in Empowering Parental Choice, EMORY UNIV.,
CANOPY FORUM INTERACTIONS L. REL. (July 14, 2020), https://canopyforum.org/2020/07/14/born-ofbigotry-died-in-religious-liberty/.
118
Carson, 973 F.3d at 49.
119
Id. at 43–44.
120
999 F.3d 98, 100, 108 (2d Cir. 2021). For a brief commentary on this case, see Charles J. Russo,
Disputes Continue over State Aid to Faith-Based Schools, SCH. BUS. AFFAIRS, June 2021, at 39–42.
114
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assisted small school systems that did not operate secondary schools.121
The Second Circuit reversed, in favor of the student, because officials
violated her rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment,
which essentially created a split between the federal circuits that the Supreme
Court has agreed to resolve.122
On further review in Makin, the Supreme Court reversed in favor
of the plaintiffs.123 Following the trend it initiated in Trinity Lutheran and
reiterated in Espinoza, in Carson, the Supreme Court reasoned that
the “nonsectarian” requirement in Maine’s statute that denied access to a
family for otherwise generally available tuition assistance payments violated
the Free Exercise Clause.124
IV.

THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS OF LEMON

A half-century after Lemon, the test is fundamentally flawed.
First, the Lemon test is contrary to the original public meaning of the
Establishment Clause. Second, as evidenced by the lack of judicial agreement
on its meaning, the test is simply unworkable as a jurisprudential test.
Third, rather than uniting Americans into what John Inazu calls a “Confident
Pluralism,” the Lemon test encourages division.125 Each of these flaws
warrants further discussion as follows.
A. Contrary to Original Public Meaning
As reviewed above, Lemon, like Everson before it, assumes the
Establishment Clause erects a Wall of Separation.126 This assumption is
simply wrong. In 1791, when the First Amendment was ratified, the original
public meaning of the Establishment Clause was not separation of church and
state but the freedom from the establishment of religion.127

121
French, 999 F.3d at 100; Mark Walsh, Court Backs Religious-School Student’s Participation in
Vermont Dual-Enrollment Program, EDUC. WEEKLY (Jan. 15, 2021), https://www.edweek.org/policypolitics/court-backs-religious-school-students-participation-in-vermont-dual-enrollmentprogram/2021/01.
122
French, 999 F.3d at 108. See, e.g., Fulton v. City of Phila., 922 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2019), rev’d,
141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021) (affirming a district court decision that the city’s cessation of foster referrals to
certain religious organizations due to their discriminatory sexual orientation policies did not violate
the Free Exercise Clause). In its reversal, the Supreme Court found that the city’s interest of equal
treatment of prospective foster parents was not compelling enough to discriminate against religious beliefs
and could not survive strict scrutiny analysis. Fulton v. City of Phila., 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1881–82 (2021).
123
Carson v. Makin, 2022 WL 2203333, — U.S. — (2022).
124
Id. at *10–*11.
125
JOHN D. INAZU, CONFIDENT PLURALISM: SURVIVING AND THRIVING THROUGH DEEP DIFFERENCE
6–7 (2016).
126
See generally Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
127
JOHN S. BAKER, JR. & DANIEL DREISBACH, Establishment Clause, in THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE
CONSTITUTION 394 (Daniel F. Forte & Matthew Spalding eds., 2d. ed. 2014).
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There is a “distinction between the separation of church and state and
the constitutional freedom from a religious establishment.”128 The idea of
separation of church and state suggests “a distance, segregation, or absence
of contact between church and state. Rather than simply forbid civil laws
respecting an establishment of religion, [the use of the Wall metaphor] has
[been used] more ambitiously . . . to prohibit contact between religious and
civil institutions.”129 Conversely, the freedom from a religious establishment
means there is no “promotion and inculcation of a common set of beliefs
through governmental authority.”130 There will be no “exclusive legal
preference for one church or religion over all others” nor any “arrangement
where the civil government imposed articles of faith and forms of worship on
all those under its authority.”131
The Framing Generation’s views focused on freedom from religious
establishment such as the Church of England rather than a separation of
church and state.132 “None of the Framers believed that a public role for
religion was an evil in itself. Rather, many opposed an established church
like the established Anglican Church in England because they believed that
it was a threat to the free exercise of religion.”133 Instead, “most Framers
supported religion, not for credal purposes, but because it promoted civic
virtue among the people, which they thought was a necessary element for the
maintenance of republican self-government.”134
This freedom from a religious establishment was understood to be
a rejection of coercion, a mandate of neutrality toward competing sects, and
a prohibition on governmental interference with religious organizations.135
As Judge Michael McConnell noted, freedom from religious establishment
“can be summarized in six categories: (1) control over doctrine, governance,
and personnel of the church; (2) compulsory church attendance; (3) financial
support; (4) prohibitions on worship in dissenting churches; (5) use of church
institutions for public functions; and (6) restriction of political participation
to members of the established church.”136 While the Lemon test certainly
would prevent the government from engaging in any of those six categories,

128

HAMBURGER, supra note 2, at 479–80.
Id. at 3.
Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I:
Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2131 (2003).
131
BAKER & DREISBACH, supra note 125, at 394.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 393–94.
134
Id. at 395.
135
Id. at 396.
136
McConnell, supra note 128, at 2131; see also Michael W. McConnell, Neutrality Under
the Religion Clauses, 81 NW. U.L. REV. 146 (1986).
129
130
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it has gone far beyond these items. If the Court wishes to be true to
the original public meaning, then it must abandon Lemon.
B. Unworkable Jurisprudentially
Lemon is simply unworkable jurisprudentially. More specifically,
since the Supreme Court first applied the Establishment Clause to the States
in Everson, it addressed six distinct categories of cases.137 First, it reviewed
“religious references or imagery in public monuments, symbols, mottos,
displays, and ceremonies . . . .”138 Second, it considered “religious
accommodations and exemptions from generally applicable laws . . . .”139
Third, it examined “subsidies and tax exemptions . . . .”140 Fourth, it resolved
disputes about “religious expression in public [K-12] schools . . . .”141 Fifth,
it addressed “regulation of private religious speech . . . .”142 Sixth, it sat in
judgment on cases dealing with disagreements over “state interference with
internal church affairs . . . .”143 Of course, other cases do not fit into the
categories, such as cases concerning Sunday closing laws and church
involvement in governmental decision-making.144
As Justice Kavanaugh observed, “The Lemon test does not explain
the Court’s decisions in any of those . . . categories.”145 First, “the Court has
relied on history and tradition and upheld various religious symbols on
government property and religious speech at government events . . . . Lemon
does not account for the results in these cases.”146 Second, the “Court has
allowed legislative accommodations for religious activity and upheld
legislatively granted religious exemptions from generally applicable laws. . .
. Lemon, fairly applied, does not justify those decisions.”147 Third, “the Court
Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct 2067, 2081 n.16 (2019).
Id. (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005)).
139
Id. (citing Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) (holding that the section of the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act increasing level of protection for the religious rights of prisoners’
and others who are incarcerated did not violate the Establishment Clause); Corp. of
Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding
the constitutionality of the ministerial exception)).
140
Id. (citing Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639
(2002)).
141
Id. (citing Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577 (1992)).
142
Id. (citing Capitol Square Rev. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) (affirming that Ohio did not violate
the Establishment Clause by permitting a private party to display an unattended cross on the grounds of the
state capitol)).
143
Id. (citing Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012)
(upholding the right of religious leaders to determine who qualifies as a minister)).
144
Id. (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (upholding Sunday closure laws as
constitutional as long as they were enacted with valid secular purposes in mind); Larkin v. Grendel’s Den,
459 U.S. 116 (1982) (invalidating a law granting the governing bodies of churches and schools the power
to effectively veto applications for liquor licenses within a 500-foot radius of their locations as violating
the Establishment Clause); Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994)).
145
Id. at 2092 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
146
Id.
147
Id.
137
138
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likewise has upheld government benefits and tax exemptions that go to
religious organizations, even though those policies have the effect of
advancing or endorsing religion. Those outcomes are not easily reconciled
with Lemon.”148
Fourth, the Supreme Court “proscribed government-sponsored prayer
in public schools. The Court has done so not because of Lemon, but because
the Court concluded that government-sponsored prayer in public schools
posed a risk of coercion of students. . . . Lemon was not necessary to the
Court’s decisions holding government-sponsored school prayers
unconstitutional.”149 Fifth, “the Court has allowed private religious speech in
public forums on an equal basis with secular speech. . . . Lemon does not
explain those cases.”150 Sixth, the Supreme Court’s cases involving
government interference with church affairs, such as Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, have never mentioned
Lemon.151
In the twenty-two cases in which the Supreme Court relied on
the Lemon test, it handed down eighteen majority opinions, of which only one
was unanimous in a K-12 school case, thirty-six separate concurrences,
forty separate dissents, three pluralities, and one per curiam order, an average
of 4.45 opinions per case.152 Additionally, the Justices avoided Lemon in
148

Id. at 2092–93 (citations omitted).
Id. at 2093.
150
Id.
151
565 U.S. 171 (2012).
152
Note: in the preceding and following footnotes only cases not already cited or discussed include
explanatory squibs. Levitt v. Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973)
(8–1 decision) (White, J., dissenting) (affirming the unconstitutionality of a statute allowing
reimbursements to non-public schools for expenses incurred administering and reporting test results plus
other records as having the primary effect of advancing religion because absent restrictions on the use
of the funds, teacher-prepared tests on religious subject matter may have been reimbursable); Comm. for
Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (6–3 decision) (Rehnquist J., dissenting
in part at 805) (striking down a law granting parents of children who attended faith-based schools state
income tax deductions); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973) (Lemon II) (6–3 decision) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting at 93 S. Ct. at 2988) (White, J., dissenting at 2993) (opinions not in U.S.) (vitiating a program
that provided reimbursements to parents whose children attended faith-based schools);
New York v. Cathedral Acad., 434 U.S. 125 (1977) (6–3 decision) (White, J., dissenting at 134) (relying
on Lemon II to strike down a law providing reimbursements to religious schools for record keeping and
testing); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980) (5–4 decision)
(Blackmun, J. with Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., dissenting at 662) (Stevens, J., dissenting at 671) (upholding
the revised statute from Nyqusit created no excessive entanglement because the state put safeguards in
place); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (5–4 decision) (Marshall, J. with Brennan, Blackmun, and
Stevens, JJ., dissenting at 404); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (5–4 decision) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring at 687) (Brennan, J., dissenting at 694) (Blackmun, J., dissenting at 726); Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38 (1985) (6–3 decision) (Powell, J., concurring at 62) (O’Connor, J., concurring at 67) (Burger,
C.J., dissenting at 84) (White, J., dissenting at 90) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting at 91); Aguilar v. Felton, 473
U.S. 402 (1985) (6–3 decision) (Powell, J., concurring at 414) (Burger, C.J., dissenting at 419)(Rehnquist,
J., dissenting at 420) (O’Connor J. with Rehnquist, J. (to Parts II & III), dissenting at 421); Sch. Dist. of
Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (5–4 decision) (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part at 398) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part at 398) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting
149
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at least seven cases, perhaps signaling the end of its usefulness.153 Lemon
may have outlived its usefulness because insofar as the Supreme Court
Justices cannot agree on the meaning of this tortious test, it is unclear how
they expect lower courts, lawyers, educators, and students to come to grips
with its meaning to avoid litigation and ensure smooth operations of their
activities.
Writing for the Court in American Legion, Justice Alito pointed out
that “[i]n many cases this Court has either expressly declined to apply the
at 400) (White, J., dissenting at 105 S. Ct. at 3248 (opinion not included in U.S.); Edwards v. Aguillard,
482 U.S. 578 (1987) (7–2 decision) (Powell, J., concurring at 597) (White, J., concurring in the judgment
at 608) (Scalia, J. with Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting at 610) (affirming the unconstitutionality of a law
banning the teaching of “evolution-science” in public schools unless accompanied by instruction on
“creation-science”); Bd. of Educ. Of Westside Cmty. Schs. V. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990)
(8–1 decision) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and in the judgment, with Scalia, J., at 258) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in the judgment, with Brennan, J., at 262) (Stevens, J., dissenting at 271) (upholding the
constitutionality of the Equal Access Act which allows student organized prayer and Bible study clubs
to meet in public secondary schools if other groups can gather during non-instructional time); Bd. of Educ.
of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 US 687 (1994) (6–3 decision) (Blackmun, J., concurring
at 710) (Stevens, J. with Blackmun & Ginsburg, JJ., concurring at 711) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part
and in judgment at 712) (Kennedy, J., concurring at 722) (Scalia, J. with Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J.,
dissenting at 732) (affirming the unconstitutionality of a law creating a public school district
with boundaries contiguous to those of a religious community); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997)
(5–4 decision) (Souter, J. with Stevens, Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ. (to Part II), dissenting at 240) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting at 255); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (6–3 decision) (citing Agostini’s
modification of Lemon) (O’Connor, J., concurring at 663) (Thomas, J., concurring at 676) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting at 684) (Souter, J. with Stevens, Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting at 686) (Breyer, J. with
Stevens & Souter, JJ., dissenting at 717); McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. Am. C.L. Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844
(2005) (5–4 decision) (O’Connor, J., concurring at 881) (Scalia, J. with Rehnquist, C.J., Thomas &
Kennedy (to Parts II & III), JJ., dissenting at 885) (affirming that a display at a county court house including
the Ten Commandments violated the Establishment Clause because there was no secular purpose);
Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (9–0 decision) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and in the judgment at 397) (Scalia, J. with Thomas, J., concurring at 397) (granting
a religious group’s request to use public school facilities where denying it would have been a form of
viewpoint discrimination because non-faith-based groups could do the same); see also Witters v. Wash.
Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (9–0 decision) (White, J., concurring at 490) (Powell, J.
with Burger, C.J., and Rehnquist, J., concurring at 490) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and in
the judgment at 493) (upholding aid to a student under the state’s vocational rehabilitation program to
finance his education at the Christian college as he prepared for the ministry because it did not advance
religion in a manner inconsistent with the Establishment Clause); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975)
(6–3 decision) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part at 373) (Burger, C.J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part at 385) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part at 387); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977) (7–2 decision) (Burger, C.J., dissenting
in part at 255) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part at 255) (Marshall, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part at 256) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part at 262) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part at 264); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (6–3 decision)
(Thomas, J., announced the plurality judgment in which Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, J., and Kennedy, J. joined)
(O’Connor, J. with Breyer, J., concurring at 836, Souter, J. with Stevens & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting at 867);
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam) (5–4 decision) (Rehnquist, C.J. with Blackmun, J.,
dissenting at 43) (Stewart, J., dissenting with no written statement at 43) (affirming the unconstitutionality
of posting the Ten Commandments in public schools).
153
See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (affirming
in a plurality decision that a display of the Ten Commandments among seventeen monuments and
twenty-one historical markers commemorating the state’s history spread out over the twenty-two acres of
the Texas State Capitol was constitutional); Elk Grove Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004), reh’g
denied, 542 U.S. 961 (2004) (rejecting a challenge to the constitutionality of the words “under God” in the
Pledge of Allegiance because the non-custodial father-plaintiff lacked standing); Town of Greece v.
Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014); Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017); Espinoza v.
Mont. Dep’t of Rev.,140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020); Carson v. Makin, 2022 WL 2203333, — U.S. — (2022).
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[Lemon] test or has simply ignored it.”154 He added that as “cases involving
a great array of laws and practices came to the Court, it became more
and more apparent that the Lemon test could not resolve them.”155
Justice Thomas, calling for the complete repudiation of Lemon, emphasized
that (1) it has no basis in the original meaning of the Constitution; (2) it is
easily manipulated to achieve whatever result the judges wish; (3) it causes
enormous confusion in both state and federal courts.156 Justice Kavanaugh
asserted the Court “no longer applies” Lemon.157 Justice Gorsuch, joined by
Justice Thomas, described “Lemon [as] a misadventure. It sought a ‘grand
unified theory’ of the Establishment Clause but left us only a mess.”158
C. Divides Americans
A half-century after Lemon, our American Republic lacks “agreement
about the purpose of our country, the nature of the common good, and the
meaning of human flourishing.”159 Unfortunately, “there is not a single
important cultural, religious, political, or social force that is pulling
Americans together more than it is pushing us apart.”160 We have forgotten
“[f]reedom flows from the tireless efforts of those who proclaim and pursue
protection of the equal human dignity of all.”161 At the same time, many are
intolerant of Americans “with a deep faith that requires them to do things
passing legislative majorities might find unseemly or uncouth . . . .”162
If our Union “conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition
that all . . . are created equal” is to “long endure,” then we must develop
a “confident pluralism that conduces to civil peace and advances democratic
consensus-building.”163 Because every American is “seeking a home where
he himself is free,” our Nation must find a way “to be steadfast in our personal
154

Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2080.
Id.
156
Id. at 2097 (Thomas, J., concurring). Further, in Espinoza, Justice Thomas expressed his disregard
for Lemon by referring to it as “this Court’s infamous test.” Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2265.
157
Id. at 2092 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
158
Id. at 2101 (Gorsuch, J. with Thomas, J., concurring).
159
TIM KELLER & JOHN INAZU, UNCOMMON GROUND: LIVING FAITHFULLY IN A WORLD OF
DIFFERENCE xv (2020).
160
DAVID FRENCH, DIVIDED WE FALL: AMERICA’S SECESSION THREAT AND HOW TO RESTORE OUR
NATION 1 (2020).
161
Danielle Allen, The Flawed Genius of the Constitution, ATLANTIC, https://www.theatlantic.com/
magazine/archive/2020/10/danielle-allen-constitution/615481/ (Oct. 5, 2020, 11:50 AM).
162
Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Rev., 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2277 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
163
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Address at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, in ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND
WRITINGS, 1859–1865, at 536 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989); Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 734 (2010) (Alito, J. with Roberts, C.J., Scalia & Thomas, JJ.,
dissenting) (quoting Brief for Gays and Lesbians for Individual Liberty as Amicus Curiae 35) (affirming
that officials in a public law school could implement a policy requiring an on-campus religious group to
admit all-comers from the student body, including those who disagree with its beliefs, as a condition of
becoming a recognized student organization).
155
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convictions, while also making room for the cacophony that may ensue when
others disagree with us.”164 Acknowledging “nobility and dignity [of] all
persons, without regard to their station in life” also requires permitting views
we may find “deeply unacceptable” or “blasphemously, disastrously,
obscenely wrong.”165 We can, and must, learn to “live with . . . those we
regard as damned.”166
The American Nation has room for “both for you and ‘a man whose
words make your blood boil, who’s standing center stage and advocating at
the top of his lungs that which you would spend a lifetime opposing at the top
of yours.’”167 Just as America was “wide enough” for Hamilton and Burr,
it is “wide enough” for red states and blue states, urban and rural, the secular
and the sacred, the new immigrant and the Tribal Nations, the descendent of
slaves and of pilgrims, people of faith and people of no faith, those who
remember Pearl Harbor and those who do not remember 9/11, the critical race
theorist and the constitutional originalist, the gay and the straight, those who
accept their biological sex and those who think gender is fluid.168
Yet, by perpetuating the idea of a Wall of Separation of Church and
State, Lemon encourages, if not engenders, division. For example, university
administrators erroneously interpreted the Establishment Clause as requiring
them to exclude student religious groups from accessing campus facilities
and obtaining funding from institutional activity fees, positions the
Supreme Court clearly rejected.169 Similarly, although the COVID-19 virus
does not distinguish between the atheist and the believer, the courts have

164
Langston Hughes, Let America Be America Again, in LET AMERICA BE AMERICA AGAIN 30 (1938);
INAZU, supra note 123, at 8.
165
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 656 (2015); Bernard Williams, Toleration: An Impossible
Virtue, in TOLERATION: AN ELUSIVE VIRTUE 18, 18 (David Heyd ed., 1996); see also INAZU, supra
note 123, at 87 (quoting the same passage from Williams to make a similar point).
166
INAZU, supra note 123, at 5 (quoting French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau).
167
Chelsey Nelson Photography LLC v. Louisville/Jefferson Cnty. Metro Gov’t, 479 F. Supp. 3d 543,
548 (W.D. Ky. 2020) (quoting THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT (Columbia Pictures 1995)) (granting a wedding
photographer’s request to enjoin enforcement of a law forbidding business owners from denying services
to individuals based on their sexual orientation because doing so was contrary to her religious beliefs where
she was likely to succeed that it violated her First Amendment right to free speech insofar photography
is a form of speech).
168
Lin-Manuel Miranda & Jeremy McCarter, The World Was Wide Enough, in HAMILTON THE
REVOLUTION 272–75 (2016). In the song, Aaron Burr realizes his mistake in shooting Alexander Hamilton
in a duel. Id. Burr then laments he should have “known [t]he world was wide enough for both Hamilton
and [him].” Id. at 275.
169
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (affirming that a university policy of denying a Christian
group access to an open forum on the campus of a public university violated the Establishment Clause as
a content-based exclusion); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995)
(rejecting the denial of funding to a Christian publication as a form of viewpoint discrimination).
For representative commentary on this case, see Robert L. Kilroy, Lost Opportunity to Sweeten the
Lemon of Establishment Clause Jurisprudence: An Analysis of Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the
University of Virginia, 6 CORNELL J.L. PUB. POL’Y 701 (1997).
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rejected the efforts of some governors to impose greater restrictions on
religious services than on secular events.170
When governmental officials, whether at the state level or in public
colleges, universities, or schools, enact policies establishing a Wall against
people of faith, they send the unmistakable message that believers are
unwelcome. Given its history and Justice Black’s animus in introducing it
in Everson, there is a distinct relationship between the acceptance of
a Wall of Separation and the acceptance of anti-religious bigotry.171
In a related matter, an underlying issue associated with divisiveness
that must be brought to the fore is the role of Justice Black in Everson and its
impact in the eventual emergence of the Lemon test.172 Put another way, while
Justice Black’s opinion in Everson upheld the statute’s permitting
transportation for children in faith-based schools, given his antipathy for
Roman Catholics, his position represented what can best be described as
a Trojan Horse. Such an assessment is apt particularly because Justice “Black
reportedly told friends that he made the approval of the aid ‘as tight’ as
possible to render it a ‘pyrrhic victory’ for aid proponents.”173
Reliance on the Wall metaphor, as incorporated by Justice Black in
Everson, should be viewed with suspicion because in later cases, as described
throughout, and until recently, when the Supreme Court applied it in its fullest
expression in Lemon to disputes involving faith-based schools, most of which
were affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church, the outcomes were often
consistent with his antipathy for it and its followers.174 Because Justice Black
170
Roman Cath. Diocese v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 67, 69 (2020); S. Bay United Pentecostal Church
v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 716, 716 (2021); Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294, 1296–97 (2021). For a brief
commentary on this issue, see Charles J. Russo, “Even in a pandemic, the Constitution cannot be put away
and forgotten:” Banning Communal Worship Poses Continuing Threats to Religious Freedom, CANOPY
FORUM (Apr. 2, 2021), https://canopyforum.org/2021/04/02/even-in-a-pandemic-the-constitution-cannotbe-put-away-and-forgotten/, and see also Paul T. Babie & Charles J. Russo, If Beer and Wrestling are
“Essential,” So Is Easter: COVID-19, Freedom of Religion or Belief, and Public Health in Australia and
the United States—Why Rights Matter, 55 NEW ENG. L. REV. 45 (2020).
171
HAMBURGER, supra note 2, at 480–81.
172
Id. at 474.
173
Thomas C. Berg, Anti-Catholicism and Modern Church-State Relations, 33 LOY. U. CHIC. L.J. 121,
127–28 (2001) (citing ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 363–64 (1994) (quoting Black’s
remarks to Truman Hobbs and Louis Oberdorfer)).
174
See, e.g., Richard F. Duncan, Just Another Brick in the Wall: The Establishment Clause
as a Heckler’s Veto, 18 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 255, 274 (2014) (“Leaping from Jefferson's 1802 letter to
Hugo Black's Everson opinion in 1947, the modern myth of separation omits any discussion of nativist
sentiment in America and, above all, omits any mention of the Ku Klux Klan.” (quoting HAMBURGER,
supra note 2, at 399)). Before joining the Court in 1937, Hugo Black was not just an ordinary member,
but rather held a leadership position in the Invisible Empire of the Ku Klux Klan. HAMBURGER, supra
note 2, at 423, 426. Indeed, as Kladd of his Klan Klavern, the soon-to-be-Justice Black was charged with
leading new members of the KKK in their recitation of the Klansman's oath of allegiance which included
allegiance to “free public schools . . . separation of church and state . . . [and] white supremacy . . . .”
Id. at 409, 426 (citations omitted). “Justice Black's Anti-Catholic views have been well-established, and
as Professor Hamburger puts it, ‘holding such views . . . Black in 1947 led the Court to declare itself in
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openly admitted his distrust of the Roman Catholic Church, his introduction
of the Wall must be viewed with the utmost suspicion.175 In short, because
the Wall metaphor divides Americans and was “born of bigotry, [it] should
be buried now.”176
V.

MOVING FORWARD: TEAR DOWN THIS WALL AND RESTORE
ORIGINAL PUBLIC MEANING
“Tear Down This Wall.”
—Ronald Reagan177

Based on its recent decisions, it appears that the Supreme Court will
take up President Reagan’s challenge concerning the Berlin Wall and tear
down the Lemon Wall of Separation and replace it with a Chain Link Fence.
In so doing, the Court will recognize the essential role of religion in the
American life of people of faith while fully protecting the autonomy
of religious organizations. In the near future, Lemon, like the Soviet Union,
is very likely to be relegated to the dust bin of history.
Yet, the seemingly imminent demise of Lemon raises the question of
what will replace it. As Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Kagan, observed,
“[T]here is no single formula for resolving Establishment Clause challenges.
The Court must instead consider each case in light of the basic purposes that
the Religion Clauses were meant to serve.”178 Justice Kavanaugh has
suggested Establishment Clause cases are principled on:
If the challenged government practice is not coercive and if it
(i) is rooted in history and tradition; or (ii) treats religious
people, organizations, speech, or activity equally to
favor of the ‘separation of church and state.”’ Duncan, supra, at 275 (quoting HAMBURGER, supra note 2,
at 463); id. at 275 n.90 (“noting that this ‘virulently anti-Catholic’ animus of strict separation ‘served as
a cohesive political and cultural agent for an increasingly fragmented Protestant majority’”); see also
Elizabeth D. Katz, “Racial and Religious Democracy”: Identity and Equality in Midcentury Courts,
72 STAN. L. REV. 1467, 1499 (2020) (“[A]t a meeting of the Catholic Club of the City of New York, . . .
the group unanimously adopted a resolution demanding that recently appointed Supreme Court Justice
Hugo Black resign or be impeached because of his membership in the Ku Klux Klan, which was antiCatholic in addition to being anti-black and anti-Jewish.”).
175
See Berg, supra note 171, at 129 (“Hugo Black Jr.’s memoirs state that his father, the justice, . . .
[had] one sentiment he did share with the Ku Klux Klan (of which Justice Black had once, famously, been
a member) was a distrust of the Catholic Church.”).
176
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 829 (2000); Helms v. Picard, 229 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2000)
(expanding the boundaries of aid to faith-based schools by upholding the constitutionality of Chapter 2 of
Title I, then Title VI, of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 7301–73, which allows
loans of instructional materials such as library books, computers, television sets, tape recorders, and maps
to non-public schools).
177
President Reagan uttered his now famous words at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin on June 12,
1987. For coverage of this historic speech, see, for example, Walter V. Robinson, Reagan Dares Soviets
in Berlin, BOS. GLOBE, June 13, 1987, at 1; Saul Friedman, “Tear Down This Wall”: Reagan, In West
Berlin, Issues Challenge to Soviets, NEWSDAY, June 13, 1987, at 5.
178
Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n., 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2090–91 (2019) (Breyer, J. with Kagan, J.,
concurring) (citations omitted).
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comparable secular people, organizations, speech, or
activity; or (iii) represents a permissible legislative
accommodation or exemption from a generally applicable
law . . . .179
Justice Kavanaugh’s overarching set of principles explains existing
Establishment Clause jurisprudence and may well represent a concise future
approach to the resolution of disputes arising under it. As such,
his overarching principles suggest three significant inquiries.
First, instead of Lemon’s secular purpose inquiry, the Supreme Court
should simply ask whether a statute or regulation is facially neutral. In other
words, as written, does the statute or regulation favor or disfavor
a particular faith? Such an inquiry is consistent with the dominant view of
the original public meaning of the Establishment Clause.180
Second, rather than rely on Lemon’s examination of the principal or
primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, the Supreme Court ought
to inquire whether a benefit is generally available to all, as in Zelman,
Trinity Lutheran, and Espinoza.181 Engaging in this kind of inquiry would
also include asking whether all groups have equal access to facilities
if a dispute involves prayer or religious activities. Justice Kavanaugh raised
a similar point in American Legion about treating groups equally.182
Third, instead of Lemon’s excessive entanglement analysis, the
Supreme Court should focus on history and tradition to determine
whether a disputed practice objectively endorses religion. For example,
in Town of Greece v. Galloway, the Court focused on history and tradition in
upholding the practice of allowing prayers to be recited at monthly meetings
of the town board, even if they were explicitly religious, as long as all who
wished to participate were able to do so.183 In other words, if a practice has
long-standing history and tradition, it cannot be viewed as endorsing religion.
Formally repudiating the Lemon test, rather than simply ignoring it as
the Roberts Court has done, would herald a return to the original public
meaning of the Establishment Clause by prohibiting governmental coercion,
banning discrimination against particular faiths, and reaffirming both
179

Id. at 2093 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
For a rejection of the idea that the Founders supported the non-preferential treatment of religion,
see Douglas Laycock, Religion and the State: Article: The Origins of the Religion Clauses of the
Constitution: “Nonpreferential” Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 27 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 875, 875 (1986).
181
See generally Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer,
137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017); Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Rev., 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020).
182
Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. at 2093 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
183
See generally 572 U.S. 565 (2014).
180
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the historical and contemporary role of religion in American life, recognizing
its role and significance as the United States’ “first freedom.”184 Should the
Supreme Court finally retire the worn-out Lemon test, the upshot would
be that all Americans would be free to choose to believe or not believe; every
religious faith would be treated the same, and long-standing traditions and
cultural norms respecting religion in the public marketplace would
be respected.185
VI.

CONCLUSION

Calling on the Supreme Court to replace the outdated, unworkable,
and historically troubled metaphor of the Wall of Separation with
a Chain Link Fence is intended to restore the original public meaning of the
Establishment Clause; thereby ensuring the significant place of faith-based
institutions, their staff members, and students by ensuring greater protections
for religious freedom. In so doing, one hopes the Court will safeguard
a continuing flow of aid to students under the Child Benefit Test and afford
religious voices their rightful places to speak out in the marketplace of
ideas.186
Concomitantly, a change of this nature would reaffirm
a foundational purpose of early American colonization and, most
significantly, a way to achieve a “Confident Pluralism.”187
In adopting a new approach to its First Amendment jurisprudence by
finally repudiating the now sour Lemon test, the Supreme Court would help
to prevent the increasing relegation of believers and their religious
institutions, essentially reducing them to second-class citizens based on their
religious beliefs, a practice Chief Justice Roberts aptly defined as “odious to
our Constitution . . . .”188 Precisely!
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POSTSCRIPT
On June 27, 2022, as this Article was being finalized for publication,
the Supreme Court handed down a significant ruling in Kennedy v. Bremerton
School District, a dispute from Washinton state, signaling a dramatic shift
in its First Amendment jurisprudence.189 For the first time, in a six-to-three
judgment, with the opinion authored by Justice Gorsuch, the Court reversed
earlier rulings.190 The Court concluded that school officials violated the
religious rights of a football coach after they suspended him and chose not to
renew his contract because he knelt in silent prayer at the fifty-yard line at the
end of games.191
Writing for the Supreme Court, Justice Gorsuch acknowledged that
“this Court long ago abandoned Lemon and its endorsement test offshoot”
as it required that “the Establishment Clause must be interpreted by ‘reference
to historical practices and understandings.’”192
In her dissent,
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Kagan and Breyer, acknowledged that
“[t]he Court now goes much further, overruling Lemon entirely and in all
contexts.”193 Stay tuned!
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